O problema da segurança social compulsiva e estatizada

Relativamente à interessante discussão sobre a segurança social que tem vindo a decorrer na blogosfera, não resisto a recomendar a leitura da seguinte passagem de Mises, que quanto a mim constitui a melhor síntese da essência do problema económico de um sistema de segurança social compulsivo e estatizado. A densidade do texto vai porventura para além do que é recomendável para discussões na blogosfera mas julgo que vale ainda assim a pena transcrevê-lo aqui para quem esteja interessado em reflectir um pouco mais em profundidade sobre a questão:

Let us consider the case of a government that has got control of the employment of a considerable part of the citizens' savings. ### The investments of the social security system, of the private insurance companies, of savings banks, and of commercial banks are to a great extent determined by the authorities and channeled into the public debt. The private citizens are still savers. But whether or not their savings bring about capital accumulation and thus increase the quantity of capital goods available for an improvement of the apparatus of production depends on the employment of the funds borrowed by the government. If the government squanders these sums either by spending them for current expenditure or y malinvestment, the process of capital accumulation as inaugurated by the saving of individuals and continued by the investment operations of the banks and insurance enterprises is cut off. A contrast between the two ways may clarify the matter:

In the process of the unhampered market economy Bill saves one hundred dollars and deposits it with a savings bank. If he is wise in choosing a bank which is wise in its lending and investing business, an increment in capital results, and brings about a rise in the marginal productivity of labor. Out of the surplus thus produced a part goes to Bill in the shape of interest. If Bill blunders in the choice of his bank and entrusts his hundred dollars to a bank that fails, he goes emptyhanded.

In the process of government interference with saving and investment, Paul in the year 1940 saves by paying one hundred dollars to the national social security institution. He receives in exchange a claim which is virtually an unconditional government IOU. If the government spends the hundred dollars for current expenditure, no additional capital comes into existence, and no increase in the productivity of labor results. The government's IOU is a check drawn upon the future taxpayers. In 1970 a certain Peter may have to fulfill the government's promise although he himself does not derive any benefit from the fact that Paul in 1940 saved one hundred dollars.

Thus it becomes obvious that there is no need to look at Soviet Russia in order to comprehend the role that public finance plays in our day. The trumpery argument that the public debt is no burden because "we owe it to ourselves" is delusive. The Pauls of 1940 do not owe it to themselves. It is the Peters of 1970 who owe it to the Pauls of 1940. The whole system is the acme of the short-run principle. The statesmen of 1940 solve their problems by shifting them to the statesmen of 1970. On that date the statesmen of 1940 will be either dead or elder statesmen glorying in their wonderful achievement, social security.

- Ludwig von Mises, Human Action


Selected readings na blogosfera:

Larachas sobre a Segurança Social. Brincando com o infinito

O grande problema da segurança social é que ...

Segurança social e corrosão da solidariedade inter-geracional

Re: Larachas sobre a Segurança Social. Brincando com o infinito

Crescimento sem poupança

Brincando com o infinito (1)


Selected readings fora da blogosfera:

O que é a Escolha Pública? Para uma análise económica da política, por José Manuel Moreira e André Azevedo Alves (Cascais: Principia, 2004): 5.3. Segurança social